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Abstract 
Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on 
reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas 
involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as 
groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have 
played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as 
those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system 
based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system 
based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable 
groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust 
to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore 
have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans. 
 
1. Introduction 
Explaining the rather high level of cooperation in humans is still a challenge for economists, 
social scientists, and evolutionary biologists, despite the variety of mechanisms that are 
known to promote cooperation (West et al., 2007). These mechanisms can be categorized as 
conferring indirect fitness benefits (i.e. kin based, if individuals interact more often with 
related partners; Hamilton, 1964) or direct fitness benefits (if based on, for example, 
beneficial by-products; Kokko et al., 2001), the latter often being founded on enforcement 
mechanisms (West et al., 2007). Enforcing mechanisms require conditional behavioural 
strategies, e.g. punishing defectors or rewarding cooperators. On the one hand, cooperation 
can be enforced if individuals inflict sanctions on wrongdoers by punishing them (Sigmund, 
2007) or by excluding them from the social group in order to avoid any future interactions 
with them (Guala, 2012; Sasaki & Uchida, 2013). On the other hand, cooperation can be 
based on reciprocity if individuals have a tendency to help those who have helped them in the 
past (i.e. direct reciprocity; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Sigmund, 2010) or those who have 
helped others (i.e. indirect reciprocity; Alexander, 1987; Earley, 2010; Nowak & Sigmund, 
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2005; Sigmund, 2012). In the latter case, an individual’s behaviour needs to be translated into 
a reputation by a set of rules that must be largely adopted within a social group. 
 
One simple rule that has been used in previous analyses is that individuals earn a good 
reputation (good image score) by being cooperative, and a bad reputation (bad image score) 
when defecting (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). It has been shown that image scoring could 
sustain cooperation even in the presence of more selfish strategies (e.g. see Leimar & 
Hammerstein, 2001) if reputation is not only binary (either “good” or “bad”) but comprises a 
third state “neutral” (Tanabe et al., 2013). Such a straightforward reputational mechanism 
enhances cooperation frequency and allows cooperative members of a group to recognise and 
trust each other (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002; Wedekind & 
Milinski, 2000; Yoeli et al., 2013) and to benefit from choosing their partners (Fu et al., 2008; 
Sylwester & Roberts, 2010), creating a biological market based on cooperativeness, i.e. 
competition among potential partners to be chosen for social interactions (Barclay, 2013). 
 
Many conditional behavioural strategies are known to promote cooperation in dyadic 
interactions, but cooperation can easily break down in collective action problems, i.e. when 
more than two individuals are involved (Hardin, 1968). Cooperation frequency in both, direct 
and indirect reciprocity, is predicted to decline rapidly with increasing group size (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1988; Fehr, 2004; Suzuki & Akiyama, 2005, 2007). Implementing positive 
incentives (rewards to co-operators) can stimulate cooperation in large groups but fails to 
stabilize it (Hauert, 2010; Sigmund et al., 2001). Moreover, as group size grows, the 
probability of knowing everybody’s reputation in a group decreases and errors become more 
likely. The role of reputation-based cooperation in collective action dilemmas has therefore 
frequently been questioned (Fehr, 2004; Suzuki & Akiyama, 2005), and probably requires to 
be linked with reputation from other types of interactions (e.g. alternate dyadic interactions).  
Nevertheless, humans often show high levels of cooperation in collective action dilemmas. 
 
Here, we test whether a reputation mechanism based on punitive actions can support 
the evolution of cooperation in groups of unrelated individuals. Punishment can increase 
cooperation levels if there are opportunities to punish defectors, that is, decreasing a 
defector’s immediate payoff at a personal immediate cost (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Raihani et 
al., 2010; Raihani et al., 2012; Sigmund, 2007). Until recently, such costly punishment has 
been perceived as an evolutionary puzzle because punishers accept costs to harm others while 
third parties benefit from the increased cooperation levels (Dreber et al., 2008; Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002; Rankin et al., 2009; Sigmund, 2007; Wu et al., 2009). However, if punishers 
can build up a punishment reputation that affects later decisions of others, punishment can 
lead to long-term benefits that compensate or even outweigh the immediate costs of 
punishment (dos Santos et al., 2011; dos Santos et al., 2013; Hilbe & Sigmund, 2010; Hilbe & 
Traulsen, 2012). This holds for dyadic interactions, but it is unclear whether punishment 
reputation facilitates the emergence of cooperation also groups larger than 2. We therefore 
compare the evolution of two types of reputational mechanisms in the same public goods 
game (PGG) followed by punishment, namely a reputation of being generous and a 
punishment reputation. In a separate third scenario, we consider a PGG followed by a 
rewarding stage and reputation based on rewards. 
 
Our analyses confirm that a reputational mechanism based on generosity is unlikely to 
lead to cooperation in larger groups because such mechanisms are sensitive to memory 
constrains, to errors in reputation assessment, and even to low frequencies of defection. 
Adding reward to cooperators allowed for the emergence of cooperation but turned out to be 
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unstable since a population of rewarders can be quickly invaded by non-rewarders, as 
predicted from previous analyses (Hauert, 2010; Sigmund et al., 2001). We find that a 
reputational mechanism based on punitive actions largely solves these problems, i.e. it resists 
higher error rates in reputation assessment and frequently allows for the evolution of stable 
cooperation within larger groups.  
 
2. Model 
 
We model a population of finite size N, with individuals playing on average m interactions per 
generation over which they can build up a reputation. For each interaction, one group of size n 
is randomly formed while the rest of the population observes the interaction. The total number 
of interactions per generation is fixed and equal to mN/n, hence individuals play m 
interactions on average. Since strategies cannot condition their behaviour on the number of 
interactions, no end game effects are possible. An interaction always comprises two stages: a 
public goods game followed by a punishment stage. In the first stage, all group members play 
a public goods game where they can contribute or not to a public good by investing an 
amount c. Their decision to contribute is based on their coplayers’ reputation (see below). The 
sum of all contributions is multiplied by a factor r (with 1 < r < n) and then equally divided 
among all group members. As in previous models (Suzuki & Akiyama, 2005), we exclusively 
investigated cases where r is a function of group size such that the incentive to cooperate 
remains similar as group size grows. In the second stage, individuals have the opportunity to 
impose fines on each defector within their group by paying an amount α for the defector to 
lose β, with α < β. The punishment decision is binary such that deciding to punish implies 
punishing all defectors irrespective of their number, and punishers have to pay α for each 
defector. At the end of a generation, individuals from the current generation are selected with 
replacement in proportion to their payoff to be the parent of a new offspring (the absolute 
value of the minimum possible payoff +1 is added to all individuals in order to avoid negative 
or zero payoffs). This process is repeated until the offspring population reaches N. A parent 
transmits culturally its strategy ({x, y, z}; see below) to its offspring (analogous to genetic 
transmission; Cavalli-Sforza, 1981). Transmission errors (mutations) occur at rate µ and lead 
to the replacement of an offspring’s strategy at random by another one. Hence all strategies 
(i.e. all combinations of x, y, z) have an equal probability of arising through mutation. 
 
We first investigate two reputation mechanisms in this public goods game followed by 
punishment. The only difference between these two conditions is the information used by the 
players, which allows us to isolate the effect of information. In one case, reputation is based 
only on cooperative and non-cooperative actions (i.e. generosity scoring). In the other case, 
reputation is only based on punitive and non-punitive actions (i.e. punishment scoring). Under 
both reputation systems, an individual’s reputation can only be in one of 3 different states: {-
1, 0, +1}. Under generosity scoring, only cooperative and uncooperative actions during the 
PGG stage of an interaction can affect reputation: an individual’s reputation, starting at 0, 
shifts to +1 after a contribution to the public good and shifts to -1 after a defection. For 
example, the reputation of a defector (-1) will directly switch to +1 if she cooperates. 
Therefore, only the previous interaction influences a player’s reputation (no difference in 
cooperation rate was found with a system under which reputation would first switch to 0 and 
potentially later to +1 in the case of a cooperative act, or from +1 to 0 and then -1 in the case 
of two consecutive defections). Under punishment scoring, only punitive and non-punitive 
actions during the punishment stage of an interaction can affect reputation. Here, an 
individual’s reputation starts at 0, shifts to +1 after punishing defectors, and shifts to -1 after 
not punishing defectors.  
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We further investigate a third reputation system based on rewards (i.e. reward 
scoring). In this condition, the punishment stage is replaced by a rewarding stage: individuals 
can reward those who contributed to the public good by paying a cost α for the other to get β. 
Here, reputation is only based on whether an individual has rewarded or not contributors to 
the PGG: an individual’s reputation starts at 0, shifts to +1 after rewarding cooperators, and 
shifts to -1 after not rewarding cooperators. 
 
Each interaction is public and everybody knows everybody’s reputation, i.e. who 
contributed to the public good (under generosity scoring) or punished defectors (under 
punishment scoring) in their last interaction. We implemented errors (e.g. based on memory 
constrains) in reputation assessment. In each interaction, a focal individual has a probability ε 
for each of her n-1 group members of forgetting their reputation. If this happens, the focal 
individual acts as if their reputation was 0. Consequently, the probability that a focal 
individual knows the reputation of all her n-1 group members is (1-ε)n-1. 
 
Individuals are defined by 3 traits: x, y and z. The first two, x and y, determine an 
individual’s behaviour in the public good game according to the following action rule: 
contribute an amount c to the public good if there are in the group at least x ϵ {1, 2, ..., n-1} 
players with reputation equal to y ϵ {-1, 0, +1}. For example, an individual with x = 5 and y = 
+1 will contribute to the public good if there are at least 5 other group members with 
reputation +1. For the punishment stage, the trait z ϵ {0, 1} determines an individual’s 
punishment strategy (i.e. never punish/punish defectors). We also added unconditional 
defectors (ALLD) and cooperators (ALLC) which could both either not punish (i.e. ALLD-0; 
ALLC-0) or punish (i.e. ALLD-1; ALLC-1). These strategies were added in this way and not 
simply by letting x range from 0 to n, because the latter option would have created a surplus 
of unconditional strategies (i.e. individuals with x = 0 but with different y would all be ALLC, 
similarly individuals with x = n but with different y would all be ALLD). 
 
All simulation runs started with a population of ALLD-0. If not stated otherwise, we 
use N = 500, m = 5, c = 1, µ = 0.002, ε  = 0, and 20,000 generations in all our simulations. 
Table 1 lists all symbols used in the model. Average cooperation frequencies are calculated 
across 10 replicates for generations 15,000 to 20,000. 
 
We have performed additional simulations with larger population sizes (N = 2500, 
5000, 10000) subdivided into (25, 50, 100, respectively) social groups of 100 individuals in 
order to reduce the effect of drift. Indeed, drift could have been an important evolutionary 
force in our simulations compared to selection because the population was composed by one 
single social group (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001). Since the probability of a neutral mutant 
going to fixation through drift in a finite population is 1/N, increasing population size allows 
us to reduce this probability. We reduced mutations rates accordingly. In order to avoid kin 
selection in this socially structured population, we use panmictic reproduction where the 
offspring of a parent in a given social group has an equal probability of ending up in any 
social group, including the parent’s. We modelled this process by random formation of social 
groups at the beginning of each generation. This amounts to a migration rate for an offspring 
of 1−1/g, where g is the number of social groups. Results for our larger subdivided 
populations with reduced drift effects confirmed our results with higher levels of cooperation 
and robustness to errors under punishment scoring than generosity scoring (Fig. A12-15). 
 
3. Results 
5	  
	  
 
In general, increasing group size decreased cooperation frequency, but higher levels of 
cooperation were reached when decisions were based on reputation from punitive instead of 
cooperative actions (Fig. 1; Fig. A1). Cooperation emerged rarely under generosity scoring 
because the evolutionary process usually led to unconditional defectors (ALLD-0) being 
invaded by discriminatory strategies (i.e. with 0 < x < n) that do not differ phenotypically 
from defectors as they only cooperate if they find themselves by chance in a group with 
sufficient cooperators (Fig. A2). Even if sufficient numbers of cooperators would be present, 
any less tolerant strategy (i.e. with a greater x value) would perform better as they would reap 
the benefit of the public good without contributing. However, when cooperation emerged with 
generosity scoring, periods of cooperative states could be stabilized with punishment (Fig. 
A3). Cooperation frequently emerged under reward scoring. However, a population of 
rewarders is likely to be invaded by non-rewarders, i.e. cooperation turned out to be unstable 
under these conditions (Fig. A4 and A5). 
 
Under punishment scoring, the dynamics during the first few thousand generations 
were similar to those under generosity scoring, i.e. discriminatory non-punishing strategies 
could invade ALLD-0 (Fig. A6). The crucial difference to generosity scoring was that as soon 
as a few punishers appeared in the population, individuals with a more tolerant strategy (i.e. 
with a lower x value) not only avoided punishment more often but also contributed to the 
public good and therefore increased the punishers’ fitness. Hence, punishers were frequently 
able to invade populations of discriminatory individuals and establish cooperation (Fig. A6). 
However, periods of cooperation could collapse when discriminatory strategies were invaded 
by punishing unconditional cooperators (i.e. ALLC-1). The latter can be invaded by non-
punishing unconditional cooperators (ALLC-0), who can in turn be invaded by ALLD-0 (Fig. 
A7). Fig. A8 and A9 show that cooperation under punishment scoring could also emerge 
more easily for different punishment ratios. 
 
Cooperation in a reputation system based on punitive actions was more robust to 
higher probabilities of forgetting the others’ reputation (Fig. 2; Fig. A10). In most cases, the 
most tolerant discriminatory strategy {x =1, y = 1, z = 0} invaded ALLD-0. This paved the 
way for punishing discriminators {x =1, y = 1, z = 1} who brought cooperation and stabilized 
it with punishment of non-contributors (Fig. A11). 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Cooperation through a reputation-based mechanism was previously believed to be 
problematic for social dilemmas involving more than two individuals (Fehr, 2004; Suzuki & 
Akiyama, 2005) because increasing group size made it harder to keep track of everybody’s 
reputation while cooperation easily breaks down after a few defections or errors. Our results 
confirm this view for reputation mechanisms that score generosity. Cooperating rarely 
evolved if reputation was based on generosity, and if it evolved, group size and the 
probability of errors in memory or information transfer were both low. A reputation system 
based on rewards does not fare any better. While favouring the emergence of cooperation, it 
fails to stabilize it since rewarders can easily be invaded by second-order free-riders who 
avoid the cost of rewarding, as found previously (Hauert, 2010; Sigmund et al., 2001). 
 
However, if punishers can build up a punishment reputation, cooperation can evolve 
even in public goods games played by large numbers of players. We found that such a 
reputational mechanism is tolerant to errors in assessments, because cooperation is likely if 
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few punishers in a group are recognized by their punishment reputation. In fact, if a player 
knows that there is at least one punisher in her group, switching from defection to cooperation 
increases her payoff by β – c(1 – r/n), i.e. the gain from not being punished (provided β > c(1 
– r/n)) reduced by the net share from the PGG. In the case of reputation-based generosity, if a 
player knows that there is at least one contributor in the group, switching from defection to 
cooperation decreases her payoff by c(1 – r/n). Therefore, as discriminators are better off 
detecting punishers instead of contributors, punishers will induce more contributions and will 
then be able to recoup the costs of punishing more rapidly. 
 
So far, the evolution of cooperation and punishment through reputation was mainly 
investigated in dyadic interactions (dos Santos et al., 2011; Hilbe & Sigmund, 2010; Hilbe & 
Traulsen, 2012). A few studies considered the effects of punishment in larger group sizes but 
with strategies that were not directly based on individual punishment reputation, or the effect 
of errors in reputation assessment was not investigated (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Brandt et 
al., 2003; Gardner & West, 2004). Boyd & Richerson (1992) showed that in an n-person 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, cooperation could be increased if individuals interacted repeatedly with 
the same group members and if they could use a strategy that never contributes until punished 
once. Brandt et al. (2003) studied the effects of information about punitive actions in groups 
of three in a spatial public goods game. They showed that cooperation was promoted when 
individuals knew whether their two neighbours were punishers or not. Gardner and West 
(2004) found that cooperation was favoured if individuals adjust their cooperation level to the 
average punishment present in the population. It may appear that the cooperative strategies 
used in these two studies required less demanding cognitive abilities than strategies based on 
individual reputation. However, they would be vulnerable to the invasion of more 
discriminatory strategies that could recognize individual punishers and defect in their absence. 
 
Our reputation system based on contributions to the PGG (i.e. generosity scoring) was 
similar to classical image scoring (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998) but with a trinary reputation (as 
in Tanabe et al., 2013) in the sense that no second-order information was taken into account. 
Therefore, a focal player who does not contribute to the PGG in a group of cooperators or in a 
group of defectors would be perceived similarly badly. It therefore remains an open question 
whether strategies using second-order information in generosity scoring (e.g. ‘standing’; 
Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001) would sustain cooperation in large groups or which 
assessment norm could possibly evolve (e.g. conferring a bad reputation to individuals 
defecting when all other group members are defectors, or conferring a bad reputation to 
individuals defecting when only half of other group members are defectors, and so on…). We 
believe such system would not be viable since a focal observer would need to correctly know 
the reputation of all the actor’s coplayers to assess the actor’s reputation, which is unlikely in 
the presence of errors and becomes increasingly unlikely as group size grows. Merely 
monitoring the presence of a few punishers seems both less subject to errors and less 
cognitively demanding. 
 
We have restrained our model to randomly formed groups, that is, we did not allow for 
partner choice or population structure for example. Hence assortment between cooperators 
could not arise. Reputation-based partner choice has been shown to promote cooperation in 
dyadic interactions (Fu et al., 2008; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010). An empirical study by 
Rockenbach & Milinski (2011) has looked at the effect of partner choice for future 
interactions in an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma. They found that about half of the subjects 
actively avoided low contributors but did not take into account punishment decisions for their 
choice, while the other half chose randomly. However, greater levels of cooperation were 
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found when punishment was present, and punishers almost never (i.e. < 3% of the cases) tried 
to hide their presence when given the opportunity, suggesting that they wanted others to know 
that they would punish low contributors. Therefore, our model restriction seems conservative 
with regard to the evolution of cooperation, i.e. partner choice is likely to further enhance 
cooperation frequency in a public game with punishment reputation.  
 
It has been argued that a good reputation could not only allow for partner choice in 
cooperative interactions or receiving more help in future interactions (Alexander, 1987; 
Roberts, 1998), but also that it might be linked to the actor’s quality (Zahavi, 1977), serving 
as an honest signal conveying information on the actor’s resources, capabilities or 
reproductive quality for example (Barclay, 2013; Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2013; Tognetti et al., 
2014). Consequently, costs of generosity in collective action dilemmas might be outweighed 
in other various contexts. In contrast to our model where all individuals have similar abilities 
to contribute or punish, models linking helping behaviors and signals require the more 
realistic assumption that individuals differ in their condition, e.g. good vs low quality 
individuals (Gintis et al., 2001; Lotem et al., 2002; Barclay & Reeve, 2012). In such 
conditions, it becomes beneficial to monitor one’s group members’ quality and/or helping 
behaviours. However, the problem of monitoring everybody correctly remains and will grow 
difficult with increasing group size. In addition, it is plausible to assume that punitive 
behaviors also convey similar and/or different information on the punishers’ condition. 
Whether monitoring the others’ punitive or cooperative behaviours will be more beneficial 
from an individual’s point of view and whether it will better enhance cooperation will depend 
on the relative information conveyed by both behaviors and their advantage in other contexts. 
Hence, linking not only helping but also punitive behaviors to quality in different social 
contexts remains an interesting line of research. 
 
A previous model by Panchanathan & Boyd (2004), inspired by empirical work 
(Milinski et al., 2002), has shown that alternating stages of PGG with dyadic “mutual aid” 
interactions and linking reputation from both stages could maintain the population in a 
cooperative state. Contributors to the PGG gain a good reputation and are later more likely to 
receive help in dyadic interactions. With such mechanism, cooperators are able to socially 
exclude non-contributors to the PGG at no personal cost, whereas in our model punishing 
free-riders was individually costly. This mechanism seems able to stabilize cooperation more 
efficiently than ours. However it does not provide a solution to the evolution of cooperation in 
collective actions because strategies that link reputation from both stages are unable to invade 
strategies that do not, leaving open the question of how collective action arises (Panchanathan 
& Boyd, 2004). In contrast, our model has shown the initial emergence of cooperation and 
punishment from rare. Furthermore, in order to effectively direct help towards contributors to 
the PGG during the “dyadic interaction” stage, individuals again need to monitor correctly 
who contributed or not in the previous PGG interaction. It remains unknown whether 
observing punitive behaviors under these circumstances would confer similar advantages as 
the in our model. 
 
A further conservative assumption of our model (with respect to the emergence of 
cooperation) is that punishment could not be conditional to the number of punishers in the 
group (Boyd et al., 2010). However, because only one or a few individuals need to punish 
defectors in order to maintain high levels of cooperation within a group, punishment in n-
player public goods games can also be studied as a volunteer’s dilemma (Przepiorka & 
Diekmann, 2013; Raihani & Bshary, 2011). The benefit of punishment is then a non-linear 
function of the number of punishers, i.e. punishment could become more effective if used 
8	  
	  
conditionally. However, such conditional strategies lead to new dilemmas, and there is a need 
to explore the effects of punishment and punishment reputation implemented as a volunteer’s 
dilemma in n-players games. 
 
Our study further highlights the potential significance of punishment reputation for the 
evolution of cooperation not only in dyadic interactions but also in public goods games, i.e. 
cooperation dilemmas faced simultaneously by larger groups. Allowing reputation to be based 
on punitive rather than cooperative actions leads to higher levels of cooperation in larger 
groups and is less affected by memory constrains. We conclude that the interplay between 
punishment and punishment reputation must have played a crucial role for the evolution of 
social behaviours within early human groups facing collective action dilemmas. 
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Table 1 
Table 1. List of symbols used in the model.  
symbol definition 
x number of partners (x ∈∈ {1, 2, 3, …, n-1}) 
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y reputation of partners (y ∈∈ {-1, 0, +1}) 
z punishment strategy (z ∈∈ {0, 1}) 
N population size 
n group size 
c cost of helping 
r public good multiplication factor (1 < r < n) 
α cost of punishing 
β cost of being punished (α < β) 
m average number of rounds played per individual 
µ mutation rate 
ε error rate in reputation assessment 
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Fig. 1  Cooperation frequency (mean ± SE) dependent on group size. Cooperation rates 
decrease with increasing group size, and higher levels of cooperation are reached with a 
reputation system based on punitive (punishment scoring) rather than cooperative (generosity 
scoring) actions. Parameter values are: r = 0.9n, α = 0.1, β = 0.3. 
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Fig.2  The effect of increasing the probability of forgetting a player’s reputation (ε) on 
cooperation frequency, indicated by the size of the circles. A reputation system based on 
punitive actions (A) is more robust to the inclusion of errors in reputation assessment than one 
based on cooperative actions (B). Parameters values are: r = 0.66n, α = 0.1, β = 0.5. 
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Reputation	  based	  on	  punishment	  rather	  than	  generosity	  
allows	  for	  the	  evolution	  of	  cooperation	  in	  sizable	  groups	  	  
Miguel	  dos	  Santos	  &	  Claus	  Wedekind	  Department	  of	  Ecology	  and	  Evolution,	  Biophore,	  University	  of	  Lausanne,	  1015	  Lausanne,	  Switzerland.	  	  Supplementary	  material	  
	  	  Fig.	  A1.	  
	  
Prevalence	  of	  cooperation	  in	  function	  of	  group	  size	  (mean	  ±	  SE).	  Although	  cooperation	  rates	  decrease	  with	  increasing	  group	  size,	  higher	  levels	  of	  cooperation	  are	  reached	  with	  a	  reputation	  system	  based	  on	  punitive	  (punishment	  scoring)	  rather	  than	  cooperative	  (generosity	  scoring)	  actions.	  Parameter	  values	  are:	  r	  =	  0.66n,	  α	  =	  0.3,	  β	  =	  1,	  ε	  =	  0.	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Fig.	  A2.	  
	  
Typical	   simulation	   run	  with	   generosity	   scoring	   for	   a	   group	   size	   of	   12,	  with	   (A)	   frequencies	   of	  strategies	   and	   (B)	   frequencies	   of	   cooperation	   (blue)	   and	   punishment	   (green).	   Only	   the	   most	  frequent	   strategies	   are	  plotted	   to	   enhance	   clarity.	  Unconditional	   strategies:	   red:	  ALLD-­‐0.	  Non-­‐punishing	   conditional	   strategies:	   dark	   blue:	   {1,1,0},	   grey:	   {2,1,0},	   dark	   green:	   {3,1,0},	   green:	  {4,1,0},	   dark	   grey:	   {5,1,0},	   purple:	   {7,0,0},	   blue:	   {7,1,0},	   cyan:	   {8,1,0},	   orange:	   {9,1,0},	   yellow:	  {10,1,0}.	  Punishing	  conditional	  strategies:	  dark	  red:	  {3,0,1},	  light	  blue:	  {4,0,1}.	  Parameters	  values	  are:	  r	  =	  0.66n,	  α	  =	  0.1,	  β	  =	  0.3,	  ε	  =	  0.	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Fig.	  A3.	  
	  
	  
Typical	   simulation	   run	  under	   generosity	   scoring	   for	   a	   group	   size	  of	  3,	  with	   (A)	   frequencies	  of	  strategies	   and	   (B)	   frequencies	   of	   cooperation	   (blue)	   and	   punishment	   (green).	   Periods	   of	  cooperative	  states	  can	  sometimes	  be	  stabilized	  with	  punishment,	  but	  usually	  collapse	  as	  are	  able	  to	   invade.	   For	   clarity,	   only	   the	  most	   frequent	   strategies	   are	   plotted.	   Unconditional	   strategies:	  red:	   ALLD-­‐0,	   light	   blue:	   ALLC-­‐0,	   dark	   green:	   ALLC-­‐1,	   dark	   red:	   ALLD-­‐1.	   Non-­‐punishing	  conditional	  strategies:	  dark	  grey:	  {1,-­‐1,0},	  green:	  {1,0,0},	  dark	  blue:	  {1,1,0},	  blue:	  {2,-­‐1,0},	  cyan:	  {2,-­‐1,1},	  orange:	  {2,0,0},	  yellow:	  {2,0,1},	  grey:	  {2,1,0},	  purple:	  {2,1,1}.	  Parameters	  values	  are:	  r	  =	  0.66n,	  α	  =	  0.1,	  β	  =	  1,	  ε	  =	  0.	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Fig.	  A4	  
	  
Typical	   simulation	   run	   with	   reward	   scoring	   for	   a	   group	   size	   of	   3,	   with	   (A)	   frequencies	   of	  strategies	  and	  (B)	  frequencies	  of	  cooperation	  (blue)	  and	  rewarding	  (green).	  Cooperation	  quickly	  appears	  in	  the	  simulations	  but	  fails	  to	  be	  stabilized,	  resulting	  in	  a	  mixture	  of	  rewarding	  and	  non-­‐rewarding	   strategies.	   For	   clarity,	   only	   the	  most	   frequent	   strategies	   are	   plotted.	   Unconditional	  strategies:	   red:	   ALLD-­‐0,	   light	   blue:	   ALLC-­‐0,	   dark	   green:	   ALLC-­‐1.	   Non-­‐rewarding	   conditional	  strategies:	   dark	   blue:	   {1,1,0},	   orange:	   {2,-­‐1,0}.	   Rewarding	   conditional	   strategies:	   dark	   grey:	  {1,1,1}.	  Parameters	  values	  are:	  r	  =	  0.9n,	  α	  =	  0.5,	  β	  =	  1.5,	  ε	  =	  0.	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Fig.	  A5	  
	  
Typical	   simulation	   run	   with	   reward	   scoring	   for	   a	   group	   size	   of	   3	   with	   errors	   in	   reputation	  assessment,	   with	   (A)	   frequencies	   of	   strategies	   and	   (B)	   frequencies	   of	   cooperation	   (blue)	   and	  rewarding	   (green).	   For	   clarity,	   only	   the	   most	   frequent	   strategies	   are	   plotted.	   Unconditional	  strategies:	   red:	   ALLD-­‐0,	   light	   blue:	   ALLC-­‐0,	   dark	   green:	   ALLC-­‐1.	   Non-­‐rewarding	   conditional	  strategies:	   dark	   blue:	   {1,1,0},	   purple:	   {1,0,0}.	   Rewarding	   conditional	   strategies:	   dark	   grey:	  {1,1,1}.	  Parameters	  values	  are:	  r	  =	  0.9n,	  α	  =	  0.5,	  β	  =	  1.5,	  ε	  =	  0.3.	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Fig.	  A6.	  
	  
	  A	  typical	  simulation	  run	  for	  n	  =	  12	  with	  a	  reputation	  system	  based	  on	  punitive	  actions	  (punishment	  scoring),	  with	  (A)	  frequencies	  of	  strategies	  and	  (B)	  frequencies	  of	  cooperation	  (blue)	  and	  punishment	  (green).	  Only	  the	  most	  frequent	  strategies	  are	  plotted.	  Red:	  ALLD-­‐0,	  dark	  green:	  ALLC-­‐1.	  Non-­‐punishing	  conditional	  strategies:	  green	  {4,1,0},	  dark	  blue	  {1,1,0},	  blue	  {7,1,0},	  cyan	  {8,1,0},	  orange	  {9,1,0},	  yellow	  {10,1,0},	  grey	  {11,1,0}.	  Punishing	  conditional	  strategies:	  dark	  grey	  {1,0,1},	  blue	  {1,1,1},	  purple	  {2,1,1},	  dark	  red	  {3,0,1},	  light	  blue	  {4,0,1}.	  Parameters	  values	  are:	  r	  =	  0.66n,	  α	  =	  0.1,	  β	  =	  1.	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Fig.	  A7.	  
	  
	  
A	  typical	  simulation	  run	  under	  punishment	  scoring	  for	  a	  group	  size	  of	  12,	  with	  (A)	  frequencies	  of	  strategies	   and	   (B)	   frequencies	   of	   cooperation	   (blue)	   and	   punishment	   (green).	   Periods	   of	  cooperation	   could	   intermittently	   collapse	   as	   discriminatory	   strategies	   can	   be	   invaded	   by	  punishing	   unconditional	   cooperators.	   The	   latter	   can	   then	   be	   invaded	   by	   non-­‐punishing	  unconditional	  cooperators	  who	  can	   in	  turn	  be	   invaded	  by	  non-­‐punishing	  defectors.	  For	  clarity,	  only	  the	  most	  frequent	  strategies	  are	  plotted.	  Unconditional	  strategies:	  red:	  ALLD-­‐0,	  light	  green:	  ALLC-­‐0.	   Non-­‐punishing	   conditional	   strategies:	   blue:	   {1,0,0},	   ,	   dark	   blue:	   {1,1,0},	   cyan:	   {2,0,0},	  dark	   green:	   {3,1,0},	   green:	   {4,1,0},	   purple:	   {5,0,0},	   brown:	   {5,1,0}.	   Punishing	   conditional	  strategies:	   	   dark	   grey:	   {1,0,1}	   yellow:	   {2,0,1},	   black:	   {3,0,1},	   orange:	   {3,1,1},	   light	   blue:	   {4,0,1},	  grey:	  {5,1,1}.	  Parameters	  values	  are:	  r	  =	  0.66n,	  α	  =	  0.1,	  β	  =	  0.3,	  ε	  =	  0.	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Fig.	  A8.	  
	  
Cooperation	  frequency	  for	  different	  punishment	  costs	  (α)	  and	  impacts	  (β)	  for	  a	  group	  size	  of	  12	  with	   punishment	   scoring	   (A)	   and	   generosity	   scoring	   (B).	   With	   punishment	   scoring,	   higher	  cooperation	   rates	   are	   reached	   for	   lower	   punishment	   costs	   and	   impacts.	   Circle	   size	   represents	  cooperation	  frequency.	  Parameters	  values	  are:	  r	  =	  0.66n,	  ε	  =	  0.	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Fig.	  A9	  	  
	  Cooperation	  frequency	  for	  different	  costs	  of	  punishing	  (α)	  and	  being	  punished	  (β)	  with	  punishment	  scoring	  (A)	  and	  generosity	  scoring	  (B).	  Circle	  size	  represents	  cooperation	  frequency.	  Parameters	  values	  are:	  n	  =	  6,	  r	  =	  0.66n,	  ε	  =	  0.	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Fig.	  A10.	  
	  
Effect	  of	   increasing	  the	  probability	  of	   forgetting	  a	  player’s	  reputation	  with	  punishment	  scoring	  (triangles)	  and	  generosity	  scoring	  (circles)	  for	  a	  group	  size	  of	  3	  (A)	  and	  6	  (B).	  Parameter	  values	  are:	  	  r	  =	  0.66n,	  α	  =	  0.1,	  β	  =	  1.	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Fig.	  A11.	  
	  
	  
Typical	  simulation	  run	  with	  punishment	  scoring	  for	  a	  group	  size	  of	  12,	  with	  (A)	  frequencies	  of	  strategies	  and	  (B)	   frequencies	  of	  cooperation	  (blue)	  and	  punishment	  (green).	  Even	  though	  the	  probability	  of	  forgetting	  a	  player’s	  reputation	  is	  ε	  =	  0.3,	  cooperation	  can	  still	  emerge.	  For	  clarity,	  only	  the	  most	  frequent	  strategies	  are	  plotted.	  Unconditional	  strategies:	  red:	  ALLD-­‐0,	   light	  blue:	  ALLC-­‐0,	   dark	   green:	   ALLC-­‐1.	   Non-­‐punishing	   conditional	   strategies:	   dark	   blue:	   {1,1,0},	   ,	   cyan:	  {3,1,0},	   ,	   purple:	   {5,1,0},	   dark	   red:	   {6,1,0},	   blue:	   {7,1,0},	   orange:	   {9,1,0},	   yellow:	   {10,1,0},	   grey:	  {11,1,0}.	   Punishing	   conditional	   strategies:	   dark	   grey:	   {1,0,1},	   green:	   {6,0,1}.	   Parameters	   values	  are:	  r	  =	  0.66n,	  α	  =	  0.1,	  β	  =	  0.3.	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Fig.	  A12	  
 
The effect of increasing the probability of forgetting a player’s reputation (ε) on cooperation 
frequency, indicated by the size of the circles. A reputation system based on punitive actions 
(A) is more robust to the inclusion of errors in reputation assessment than one based on 
cooperative actions (B). Parameters values are: N = 2500, r = 0.9n, α = 0.1, β = 0.3, µ = 
0.0004. 
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Fig.	  A13	  
 
The effect of increasing the probability of forgetting a player’s reputation (ε) on cooperation 
frequency, indicated by the size of the circles. A reputation system based on punitive actions 
(A) is more robust to the inclusion of errors in reputation assessment than one based on 
cooperative actions (B). Parameters values are: N = 2500, r = 0.66n, α = 0.1, β = 0.5, µ = 
0.0004. 
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Fig.	  A14	  
 
The effect of increasing the probability of forgetting a player’s reputation (ε) on cooperation 
frequency, indicated by the size of the circles. A reputation system based on punitive actions 
(A) is more robust to the inclusion of errors in reputation assessment than one based on 
cooperative actions (B). Parameters values are: N = 5000, r = 0.9n, α = 0.1, β = 0.3, µ = 
0.0002. 
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Fig.	  A15	  
	  Prevalence	  of	  cooperation	  in	  function	  of	  group	  size	  (mean	  ±	  SE).	  Although	  cooperation	  rates	  decrease	  with	  increasing	  group	  size,	  higher	  levels	  of	  cooperation	  are	  reached	  with	  a	  reputation	  system	  based	  on	  punitive	  (punishment	  scoring)	  rather	  than	  cooperative	  (generosity	  scoring)	  actions.	  Parameter	  values	  are:	  N=104,	  r	  =	  0.9n,	  α	  =	  0.1,	  β	  =	  0.1,	  ε	  =	  0,	  µ	  =	  10-­‐4.	  
 
